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Debate
The case for risk-based premiums in public health
insurance
peter zweifel* and michael breuer
Socioeconomic Institute of the University of Zurich, Switzerland
Abstract: Uniform, risk-independent insurance premiums are accepted as part of
‘managed competition’ in health care. However, they are not compatible with
optimality of health insurance contracts in the presence of both ex ante and ex post
moral hazard. They have adverse effects on insurer behaviour even if risk adjust-
ment is taken into account. Risk-based premiums combined with means-tested,
tax-financed transfers are advocated as an alternative.
1. Introduction
In the course of the past decade, several countries have turned to competition
between public health insurers in the hope of spurring innovation that ulti-
mately would contribute to controlling the surge of health care expenditure.
The concept is that of ‘managed competition’, implying that health insurers
continue to be subject to many regulations (Enthoven, 1986). Among these
regulations, uniform, risk-independent premiums are accepted as a given, with
e.g. the imposition of community rating at the level of employees of a firm in
the United States, a uniform contribution rate in terms of labour income to be
charged by a given insurer in Germany and the Netherlands, and uniform abso-
lute premiums to be charged by a given insurer in Switzerland. The common
feature of these (and other) variants is that differences in expected loss must
not be reflected in contributions. The present contribution purports to show
that uniformity of health insurance premiums entails a considerable loss in
terms of efficiency, while not necessarily serving accepted distributional goals.
Open enrolment is assumed throughout because otherwise competition would
be stifled; however, open enrolment makes self-selection of risks possible, which
induces additional regulation. It will be shown that this regulation, while failing
to prevent fully risk selection, causes efficiency loss. The contribution also
contains a policy proposal for an alternative solution designed to reach
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distributional objectives, while reaping the efficiency gains to be had by permit-
ting premiums to reflect risk.
The next section is devoted to a review of the properties of optimal health
insurance contracts in the presence of moral hazard. The distinction between
ex ante and ex post moral hazard is relevant for the definition of the term
‘risk’ in calculating the premium. In both cases, however, theory indicates
that premiums must reflect risk to achieve efficiency. Conversely, uniformity
of premiums causes efficiency losses originating from non-optimal behaviour
of the insured. Next, Section 3 focuses on the consequences of imposing uni-
form premiums for insurer behaviour. The presence of a risk adjustment scheme
designed to counteract the increased incentive for risk selection is assumed
throughout. The finding is that even refined schemes cannot meet this objective.
In Section 4, the same analysis is performed with regard to product innovation
to conclude that risk adjustment schemes of the type presently known inher-
ently punish innovative effort on the part of insurers. Since the several failures
identified are ultimately due to the regulation of health insurance premiums,
Section 5 sketches an alternative. It consists of risk-based premiums, comple-
mented by a tax-financed transfer mechanism. Through means-tested premium
subsidies, the public purse takes over the redistribution function from health
insurers. A rough calculation for the case of Germany indicates that the budget-
ary consequences become rather small, once the present shortfall in tax revenue
caused by shared employer and employee contributions for health insurance are
taken into account. The final section concludes.
2. Incompatibility of optimal health insurance contracts with uniform premiums
In this section, the properties of optimal insurance contracts are reviewed with
special reference to health insurance. The objective is to obtain a benchmark
against which a contract imposing uniform, risk-independent premiums can
be compared and to gauge the severity of efficiency loss imparted. Thus, focus
is on efficiency because uniform premiums need not guarantee equity. Indeed,
they result in a cross-subsidization of high-risk, high-income individuals by
low-risk, low-income individuals. This can result in counter-productive effects.
For example, a healthy young blue-collar worker subsidizes a wealthy older
manager who is a heavy user of medical services. Equity considerations seem
to call for redistribution from everyone else to the doubly disadvantaged, viz. the
high-risk, low-income individuals. This requirement is taken up in Section 5,
on risk-based premiums and transfers as an alternative.
For the optimality of an insurance contract, the main difference is whether
there is moral hazard or not. Without moral hazard, optimal contracts could
be designed exclusively to prevent adverse selection. Since this involves insurer
behaviour at least to some extent, consideration of this case is deferred to
Section 3. With moral hazard present, the objective of an insurance contract
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becomes to induce overall optimal behaviour of the insured ex ante (in the guise
of preventive effort) as well as ex post (in the guise of HCE in the event of
illness). This distinction also points to the definition of the term ‘risk’ when
talking about risk-based premiums. In the context of ex ante moral hazard,
this is the probability of illness (p) resulting from preventive effort (V). In the
case of ex post moral hazard, it is the size of the loss (L) given that illness has
occurred.
2.1 Optimal contracts in the presence of ex ante moral hazard
Ex ante moral hazard would not be a problem if the premium could be made to
depend on the probability of illness as it results from preventive effort. The
insurer would simply calculate the premium according to the observable prob-
ability of illness p, which is the result of preventive effort V. The premium
reduction for preventive effort would become the marginal return to the
insured, who would balance it against the marginal cost of prevention (Ehrlich
and Becker, 1972). Some distortions cannot be excluded even in this ideal situa-
tion, e.g. because a loading magnifies the marginal return in terms of premium
saved or because the insurer does not find it worthwhile to obtain a precise esti-
mate of p in view of cost. Still, this first-best solution can be attained only if
premiums are allowed to vary with preventive effort and, therefore, with the
resulting probability p.
Of course, the far more relevant case is the one of ex ante moral hazard, with
the insurer unable to honour preventive effort (see Figure 1 again). Here, the
question arises as to whether the insurer can devise a contract that induces at
least some preventive effort (in keeping with the incentive compatibility con-
straint), while getting the insured to buy it (participation constraint). For simpli-
city, the argument is couched in an expected utility framework. This does not
constitute a severe loss of generality in view of the robustness of comparative
static results with respect to leading non-expected utility alternatives (Machina,
1995; Gollier, 2000). Moreover, direct utility effects of health are neglected
unless otherwise stated. Again, the loss of generality is limited. The marginal
returns to prevention would have to be augmented by the financial equivalent
of improved health. Therefore, it is conceivable that some preventive effort is
forthcoming without any contractual incentives. Whether this would be the
optimal amount is uncertain, however, and contractual incentives may still be
important for reaching the optimal level.
What the simplified model predicts is that: given full insurance coverage, the
optimal level of prevention is zero. Conversely, it takes less than full coverage to
induce a positive amount of preventive effort. In order to satisfy the participa-
tion constraint, the insurer must reduce the premium accordingly so that the
expected utility of the insured can be higher than the alternative with full cover-
age with its associated premium in case of zero preventive effort. Individuals
who can count on a high marginal effectiveness of their preventive effort will
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see their participation constraint satisfied at a rather small reduction in pre-
mium. These considerations again result in the requirement that the optimal
premium must reflect p as it results from preventive effort. Since the amount
of cost sharing for optimally limiting ex ante moral hazard depends also on
individual parameters (specifically, marginal effectiveness and opportunity
cost of prevention), premiums and premium differentiation according to cost
sharing cannot be uniform for optimality.
At this point, an element of regulation should be mentioned that must be
retained in any ‘managed competition’ concept. As argued by Pauly (1974),
the insured may try to combine zero preventive effort (V ¼ 0) with paying a pre-
mium calculated for V> 0 by signing more than one contract, each specifying
some cost sharing and hence a premium for V> 0, but with the joint effect of
granting full coverage, making V ¼ 0 optimal. To prevent this accumulation
of coverage, insurers should be allowed to share information with regard to
total coverage of their clients. If the public purse contributes to the payment
of the premium in any way (through hidden tax subsidies or explicit subsidies
Figure 1. Optimal health insurance contracts
Optimal contract
No moral hazard With moral hazard
Ex-ante
moral hazard
Ex-post
moral hazard
Insurer
can honor
preventive
effort
Insurer 
cannot 
honour
preventive
effort
Insurer observes 
health care 
expenditure only
Insurer 
observes
health status
Source: Zweifel and Breyer (1997), Ch. 6.1
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as proposed in Section 5 below), there is an interest in requiring a minimum
degree of cost sharing. In this event, regulation would have even to identify a
leading insurer that fixes the overall amount of cost sharing, with supple-
mentary insurers being prohibited from letting total coverage exceed that
threshold.
Conclusion 1: In the presence of ex ante moral hazard, incentive compatibil-
ity generally calls for partial insurance coverage, and the par-
ticipation constraint, for a lowered premium. Premiums thus
optimally are risk-based.
2.2 Optimal contracts in the presence of ex post moral hazard
Once some illness has materialized, again an issue of observability arises. If
health status is observable or it is made observable by a physician as an
impartial observer, then indemnity insurance is optimal (Zeckhauser, 1970).
The indemnity is fixed in a way as to make the final health status identical
across illnesses. In this way, the marginal utility of wealth can be made equal
across all states of health. Since the marginal cost of medical care is fully borne
by the insured beyond the indemnity, the choice of intensity of treatment can be
left to the insured. This serves to neutralize fully the propensity of moral hazard
the insured might have. Still, this uniformity of benefits does not imply
uniformity of premiums because probabilities of different illness states may dif-
fer between individuals. In a competitive health insurance market, premiums
that make optimal indemnity contracts viable must therefore be risk-based
again.
The far more relevant case of ex post moral hazard is of course when health
status is unobservable. What remains observable is health care expenditure
(HCE), and the optimizing instrument in the hands of the insurer is once
more the degree of cost sharing. As shown by Zeckhauser (1970) and more
recently Blomqvist (1997), a cost-sharing rule that is non-linear in expenditure
turns out to be generally optimal. For example, Buchanan et al. (1991) simulate
optimal insurance policies to arrive at a $200 deductible and a 25% coinsur-
ance rate, whereas Blomqvist (1997) comes up with a cost sharing of 27% at
roughly $1,000 and declining to 5% at roughly $30,000. The parameters of
the rule depend on individual characteristics, implying that uniform premiums
once more cannot be optimal.
If the analysis is restricted to a linear cost-sharing rule involving the single
coinsurance parameter c, the value of c optimally depends on the elasticity of
the demand for medical care with regard to c, which amounts to a price elasti-
city (Zweifel and Breyer, 1997, Chapter 6.5). The more marked this price elas-
ticity, the more important the ex post moral hazard effect, which needs to be
counteracted by cost sharing in the insurance contract. In a generalized analysis
with many health states, their probabilities along with the corresponding
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marginal utilities of wealth enter as additional parameters. Finally, the generos-
ity of sick leave pay affects ex post moral hazard effects on the demand for
health care (Zweifel and Manning, 2000), which suggests that optimal health
insurance depends on additional parameters. Uniform premiums are not able
to accommodate these individual differences in price elasticities, probabilities,
and parameters from other insurance contracts.
Conclusion 2: In the presence of ex post moral hazard, cost sharing in
response to individual parameters such as price elasticities of
demand for medical care is optimal, resulting in risk-based
premium reductions and hence premiums.
Conclusions 1 and 2 are in terms of conventional health insurance, and we may
wonder whether they are relevant for managed care. In fact, a managed-care
insurer must take into account ex ante moral hazard in much the same way
as a conventional one because @p/@V, the relationship between preventive
effort and probability of illness, remains fully under the influence of the
insured. After all, physicians do not seem to have much effect on the patients’
probability of falling ill, whether working for a managed-care or conventional
insurance organization. In the case of ex post moral hazard, the issue becomes
the extent to which the insured retain some degree of influence on HCE. In
the extreme case of no cost sharing at all, the managed-care insurer must rely
on physicians as rationing agents. The insured then select a contract not
according to cost-sharing parameters as in conventional insurance but accord-
ing to the importance of insurer considerations in medical decision making,
which is maximum in the staff HMO model and minimum for Independent
Practice Associations (Glied, 2000). As long as physicians practise different
styles when dealing with different types of managed-care patients, an ex post
moral hazard effect exists, which can be counteracted by charging a higher
premium for granting access to physicians that are more accommodating
than others. Therefore, uniform premiums again are not compatible with
optimality, although the incompatibility is less marked than in conventional
medical care.
3. Uniform premiums, risk adjustment, and health insurer behaviour
This section is devoted to an analysis of health insurer behaviour under the con-
straint that premiums cannot be set according to risk. This means that, for
breaking even, insurers must keep total expenditure per insured below the uni-
form premium that the market will bear for their differentiated product. To
achieve this goal, they have two instruments at their disposal. One is risk selec-
tion effort, the other, cost-reducing innovation effort, which will be analyzed in
Section 4.
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3.1 Risk adjustment as induced regulation
If selection and cost-reducing innovation are two instruments available to
health insurers, the factors affecting their balance are of interest. The most
important factor is premium regulation (see Figure 2). Indeed, a necessary con-
dition for selection to be profitable is that the contribution margins of high and
low risks differ (Pauly, 1984). Uniform premiums (and indeed all forms of pre-
mium that are not risked-based) by definition cause this divergence because an
individual with high expected future HCE cannot be made to contribute a
higher premium. Quite frequently, expected HCE even exceeds the premium
received. Simply to break even, the insurer must have a sufficient number of
individuals enrolled, whose expected HCE is below the uniform premium.
This creates an incentive to undertake selection effort.
Thus, it is the premium regulation (especially in the guise of uniform pre-
miums) that tilts the balance in favour of selection and against cost-reducing
innovation. Additional regulation becomes necessary to redress the balance.
For an extended list of measures, see Van de Ven and Ellis (2000); however,
risk adjustment occupies the prominent place among them. Risk adjustment is
a mechanism that equalizes the difference between premiums received and
expected HCE across risk groups. A risk adjustment scheme receives payments
from insurers enrolling with a below-average share of high risks and uses these
funds to disburse payments to insurers enrolling with an above-average share of
high risks. In all, risk adjustment can bee seen as a secondary regulation induced
by the primary regulation of uniform premiums, designed to neutralize its
undesired side effects.
Figure 2. Effects of uniform premium regulation on insurer behaviour
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In the following, it will be argued that risk adjustment necessarily is imperfect,
thus failing to fully counteract the distortion of incentives caused by uniform pre-
miums. One such failure is of a general type and can be shown at this point.
In order to keep insurers’ incentives for cost control in tact, risk adjustment
needs to be prospective. This means that risk adjustment should be based on
predicted future rather than actual HCE. However, this burdens insurers with
unexpected deviations in HCE from their expected value. To the extent that
these insurers are mutuals rather than companies quoted on the stock exchange,
their owners have minimum possibility to get their insurance managers to act in
a risk-neutral manner. Therefore, prospective risk adjustment is resisted by the
industry and in several countries given up in favour of retrospective risk adjust-
ment (Van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). Other failures are more specific to direct
and indirect selection, to be expounded below.
3.2 Problems of risk adjustment and direct selection
Direct selection occurs if the insurer observes certain characteristics of an
individual that allow a forecast of future HCE (see Figure 2). Notably, age,
sex, and pre-existing health conditions can be used to screen high risks, who
are not enrolled at all if possible. For example, application forms are not sent
and not processed or processed with exceedingly long delays in the hope that
the applicant loses patience. Alternatively, the representative of the insurer
may even point out a competitor as being more suitable. Of course, this violates
the insurers’ obligation to contract; however, such obligation is often costly to
enforce. Moreover, obligation to contract does not preclude indirect selection
(see Section 3.3). The alternative is to put in place a risk adjustment scheme
that neutralizes the differences in expected HCE that are associated with a char-
acteristic. This means that the regulator must be able to relate HCE to the
relevant characteristics (called risk adjusters).
Existing research shows that on the basis of publicly observable risk adjus-
ters, such as age, sex, and place of residence, only 3–4% of the variance in
annual individual HCE can be predicted (Van de Ven and Van Vliet, 1992;
Beck and Zweifel, 1998). This leaves a great deal of scope for the use of private
information that insurers will want to exploit in order to improve their own pre-
dictions. Therefore, risk adjustment cannot compensate fully for differences in
HCE due to risk characteristics (and other factors beyond the control of health
insurers, such as regional differences in input prices). Including previous HCE in
the set of risk adjusters does increase the explained share of the HCE variance,
but at the price of making risk adjustment partially retrospective. Moreover,
some 80% of the HCE variance still remains unexplained (Van Vliet, 1992).
Conclusion 3: Even partially retrospective risk adjustment falls far short of
neutralizing health insurers’ incentives for direct risk selection
under uniform premium regulation.
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As a consequence, risk adjustment fails to re-establish the conditions for insurer
behaviour that is compatible with static efficiency, which would be character-
ized by an absence of risk selection effort.
In all, the incentive for indirect risk selection fails to be fully neutralized.
3.3 Problems of risk adjustment and indirect selection
Indirect selection occurs if insurers rely on unobserved differences in risk types.
All they have to know is what risk types exist in the population and how risk
types are related in general ways with preferences for certain contract types.
Indirect selection can be operated through the choice of (a) benefit level,
(b) benefit structure, and (c) provider structure.
(a) Indirect selection through the benefit level: In the simplest case of two risk
types differing only in terms of their illness probability p, this amounts to
offering a contract with high coverage and high premium to high risks and
low coverage and low premium to low risks. Of course, this is nothing but the
‘separating contracts’ solution to the adverse selection problem in an unre-
gulated private insurance market (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). In that
model, the alternative is a pooling contract that has been shown not to be
sustainable, unless there are few competitors in the market. In that case, an
insurer having a two-period planning horizon will realize that challenging a
competitor’s pooling contract will backfire, because the high risks, having
lost coverage, will end up in its own insured population in the second period
(Wilson, 1977). Given premium regulation, the pooling contract is legally
enforced. The financial sanction associated with deviating is the additional
payment to the risk adjustment scheme. In expected value, it must equal the
returns to be reaped from letting indirect selection work. In the case of benefit
levels, these returns depend on the following factors:
(1) The difference in expected HCE caused by the characteristic that con-
tributes to the indirect selection process;
(2) The probability that the difference in the characteristic level still exists
during the future periods making up the planning horizon of the insurer;
(3) The discounting factor used by the insurer;
(4) The cost of selection effort, i.e. of developing and launching a set of
contracts with benefit levels that effectively trigger the desired indirect
selection process, plus the financial consequences due to risk adjustment.
An optimal risk adjustment scheme would have to set payments into and
receipts from the scheme in a way that their expected value results in a balance
of zero of these four factors for each health insurer. However, present-day
schemes fall far short of taking due account of these factors:
(10) Estimates of expected HCE in relation to observable characteristics are
biased. Since current risk adjustment formulae are limited to a few observable
indicators, which in a regression jointly explain few percent of the variance of
annual HCE, unobserved characteristics are important. These are left-out
explanatory variables that generally result in biased coefficients of the
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included variables, and hence of estimated differences in HCE associated with
age, e.g. diagnostic information. If such information can be made available
legally, it does not fully solve the problem because there are still unobserved
variables. Specifically, in section2.2 itwas found that the price elasticityof the
demand for medical care in different health states influences HCE.
(20) A low risk may no longer be a low risk two or three years in the future, and
vice versa for the high risks. Indeed, Beck and Zweifel (1998) found evidence
of considerable transition probabilities. Moreover, these transition
probabilities reflect ex ante moral hazard, which is affected by the structur-
ing of contracts.
(30) The discount factor to be applied should in principle be the risk-adjusted
rate of return on the capital market; however, since health insurers typically
are not quoted on the stock market, the discount factor becomes private
information.
(40) The cost of contract development and launch is insurer-specific and
constitutes private information. In addition, the regulator would have to
know the starting point from where risk adjustment payments are to be
calculated. On the one hand, observed values of the two types of HCE may
still reflect a pooling equilibrium, where the two types are free to choose
according to their risk types. On the other hand, it may already correspond
to the separating equilibrium, with limits on coverage in the contract for low
risks. In the latter case, payments are insufficient to neutralize fully the
incentive to make indirect selection efforts.
Conclusion 4: Risk adjustment is heavily imperfect with regard to indirect
selection through benefit levels.
An alternative to risk adjustment would be to also require uniformity of benefit
levels and hence cost sharing. However, this would severely restrict insurers’
possibilities to control moral hazard.
(b) Indirect selection through the benefit structure: Here, the two risk types can
be defined, e.g. by their different probabilities of consuming medical care for a
chronic condition, in addition to medical care for an acute one. The imposi-
tion of a uniform premium causes the budget constraint for the high risks to be
shifted inward in terms of the two types of medical care and outward for the
low risks. As shown by Glazer and McGuire (2000), the two types (being
characterized by different values of p for a chronic condition) have different
preference structures, a fact that can be used to initiate indirect selection
processes. The returns to indirect selection through the benefit structure
depend on the following factors:
(1) The difference in expected HCE caused by the high risks’ preference for
the more costly chronic care;
(2) The discounting factor used by the insurer;
(3) The cost of selection effort, i.e. of developing and launching contracts that
are stingy enough in terms of chronic care to keep high risks out while
attracting low risks, plus the financial consequences due to risk adjustment.
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Contrary to case (a), transition probabilities do not enter here because of the
assumed chronicity. Again, the regulator operating a risk adjustment scheme
faces the following problems.
(10) Expected HCE of chronic patients is influenced by moral hazard effects to a
particularly high degree because of their higher level of information about
more or less costly treatment alternatives. This constitutes a specific left-out
risk adjuster that causes bias in estimated HCE differentials.
(20) The discounting factor is private information, for the reason given above in
Conclusion 4.
(30) The rationing of chronic medical care introduces the same ambiguity as
noted in (a), point (40).
An alternative to risk adjustment is to simply impose uniformity with regard to
the structure of insurance benefits. However, this would run entirely counter to
the idea of competition in health insurance, which promises an improved
matching of benefits provided and preferences of insureds. Another solution is
the institutional separation of the types of benefits (Van de Ven and Ellis,
2000). However, this may entail considerable loss of economies of scope (in
the packaging of different benefits) and advantages from substitution (in the
actual delivery of care).
Conclusion 5: Risk adjustment is also heavily imperfect with regard to indir-
ect selection through the benefit structure.
(c) Indirect selection through the provider structure: This is conceptually very
similar to selecting through the benefit structure. High risks are insured that
are particularly likely to call on the services of higher-cost providers [rather
than providers of chronic care, as in (b) above]. The imposition of a uniform
premium causes the budget constraint for the high risks to be shifted inward in
terms of the services rendered by the two provider types and outward for the
low risks (Glazer and McGuire, 2000). Here, the differences between the
budget constraints characterizing the different types of insured are accentu-
ated because the low-cost provider may make special efforts to contain moral
hazard on the part of the insured. The returns to indirect selection thus depend
on the following factors:
(1) The difference in expected cost associated with the type of provider con-
tracted with;
(2) The difference in probability of insured calling on high-cost rather than
low-cost providers;
(3) The probability that the contractual relationship with a given type of
provider still exists during the future periods making up the planning
horizon of the insurer;
(4) The discounting factor used by the insurer;
(5) The cost of selection effort, i.e. of negotiating contracts with particular
types of providers and launching the corresponding insurance policies.
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Again, present-day risk adjustment schemes are not attuned to these factors.
(10) Expected HCE differs also because insurers have different ways to control
moral hazard effects among service providers. These effects would have to
be netted out lest insurers be punished for introducing new, efficiency-
enhancing contracts.
(20) The reduced probability of visiting high-cost providers may again be the
result of efforts on the part of the insurer. Failure by the regulator to take this
into account creates the risk of punishing cost-reducing innovation.
(30) A given group of service providers may not be the same even after a single
year, mainly because of failed contract renewal. For ex ante risk adjustment,
these changes need to be accounted for.
(40) The discounting factor continues to constitute private information.
(50) The cost of negotiation with a particular group of providers must remain
private information because it importantly influences the insurer’s bargain-
ing situation.
Conclusion 6: When it comes to indirect risk selection through the provider
structure, risk adjustment is capable of neutralizing incentives
to an even lesser degree than in the cases of selection through
the benefit level (a) and the benefit structure (b).
Moreover, the regulatory alternatives available entail particularly important
efficiency losses. Imposing a uniform provider structure across insurers deprives
them of an important possibility to match their products with the preferences of
their clientele. It also becomes difficult for them to offer managed-care alterna-
tives, which require differing degrees of pre-commitment by providers to accept
rationing as a means to control moral hazard. The alternative of having insurers
offer contracts featuring one type of provider only would make economics of
scope impossible, as pointed out in the preceding paragraph. In all, a specializa-
tion of health insurers cannot occur.
Conclusions 4 through 6 together make it clear that not only present-day but
just about any imaginable risk adjustment schemes cannot re-establish the
absence of risk adjustment effort induced by uniform premiums, resulting in
failure to correct for the deviation from static efficiency (see Figure 2).
4. Uniform premium regulation, risk adjustment, and innovation effort
During the past two decades, innovation effort by health insurers has revolved
around similar issues as those discussed in the preceding section, viz. the level
of benefits, structure of benefits, and structure of providers. In the following,
the effect of uniform premium regulation on these three dimensions of innova-
tion are studied, taking again into account risk adjustment as the typical
secondary regulation complementing the imposition of uniform premiums (see
Figure 2).
(a) Innovation w.r.t. the level of benefits: This amounts to offering contracts
with different deductibles and rates of coinsurance as well as premium rebates
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for no claims (which permit insured to determine their degree of cost sharing
after the advent of illness). For instance, the Technicians’ sickness fund, which
belongs to German statutory health insurance, launched a contract with cost
sharing in 2002 (www.tk-online.de), while Swiss social health insurers offer a
choice of annual deductibles up to US$1,200 (at 2004 exchange rates). These
efforts can be interpreted as attempts to adjust the properties of health insur-
ance contracts to the presence of both ex ante and ex post moral hazard
effects, expounded in Section 2. Since these alternatives expose the insured
to differing degrees of financial risk, they must be priced differently.
Full uniformity of premiums would doom these alternatives to failure to
begin with.
Assuming that the regulator accepts some premium differentiation while
continuing a risk adjustment scheme, the incentive for innovation is still
undermined, and for the following reason. Those who choose to move to
an innovative plan tend to be of younger age (see e.g. Cutler and Reber,
1998). However, all known risk adjustment schemes rely heavily on age
as a predictor of HCE. As argued in item (10) above in Conclusion 4, age
adjustment is biased; specifically, it is likely excessive because left-out vari-
ables (such as previous HCE) correlate positively with age. An innovative
insurer, showing an increased share of young enrolees on his books, there-
fore is subject to a financial sanction that exceeds the loss of revenue that
would be induced by lower risk-based premiums for the young. In addition,
such an insurer is not fully credited for a reduction of HCE achieved, to the
extent that the schemes contain a retrospective element (which means that
high HCE incurred are partially paid for and low HCE partially taxed).
These two considerations imply that innovation with respect to the level
of benefits occurs to a suboptimal degree. This is even true of an innovation
that serves to reduce administrative cost because the young are again more
likely to react to the concomitant reduction in premiums.
(b) Innovation w.r.t. the benefit structure: Here, an important innovation is the
design of special disease management programs that coordinate the different
benefits (in terms of different types of ambulatory and hospital care as well as
drug treatments) to achieve the desired outcome. To the extent that the
insured must give up freedom of choice in the course of a treatment path,
they have to be offered a reduction in premium. However, disease manage-
ment may also be seen as an investment into quality assurance by the insurer,
justifying a higher premium. Again, this is at odds with full uniformity of
premiums. The point is that uniform premiums within type of plan are not
compatible with this type of innovation either.
One problem is that individuals opting for disease management pro-
grams are highly informed, which makes them particularly susceptible to
moral hazard (see Section 3.3, item (10) above Conclusion 5). This constitu-
tes a left-out factor that cannot even be corrected for by diagnostic infor-
mation, which by the way is needed for honoring innovative efforts in the
guise of disease management programs. Furthermore, disease management
may well reduce HCE by avoiding duplication of diagnostic tests and
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treatments but increase administrative expense. However, existing risk
adjustment schemes exclude administrative expense, a fact that discourages
innovation of this type. Finally, within a given risk group, younger indivi-
duals are more likely to opt for such programs, as argued in the preceding
paragraph. This means that innovative effort is again punished to some
degree by a risk adjustment mechanism.
(c) Innovation w.r.t. the provider structure: An important innovation in this
field is to contract with service providers who accept new forms of remunera-
tion. In order to elicit sufficient effort for cost reduction and maintenance of
quality, a two-part fee with some degree of supply-side cost sharing is optimal
(Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998). Typically, younger physicians participate
in such plans, which are usually associated with managed care and health
maintenance organizations in particular. Since young physicians tend to have
a younger clientele, an insurer launching an innovation involving a changed
provider structure again attracts young individuals, which causes a financial
sanction in all known risk adjustment schemes.
Conclusion 7: For all three types of innovation considered, insurer incentive to
launch them is annihilated by fully uniform premiums and still
attenuated by premiums differentiated by plan type combined
with risk adjustment.
It may be worthwhile to recall that a basic motivation for introducing risk
adjustment was to direct insurer effort away from risk selection and towards
innovation efforts. However, the very same risk adjustment is now found to
weaken consistently incentives to innovate. This is not compatible with
dynamic efficiency.
5. Risk-based premiums and transfers as an alternative
Clearly, uniform premium regulation in health insurance causes important
losses in terms of static (Conclusions 4 to 6) and dynamic efficiency
(Conclusion 7). This motivates reconsideration of the first-best alternative.
Given public information about risk, the first-best Pareto-optimum equilibrium
with fair premiums is full coverage for high and low risks, associated with high
and low premiums reflecting the difference in risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz,
1976). And, while the full coverage solution cannot be reached under condi-
tions of administrative expense or moral hazard, it remains true that a set of
contracts reflecting risk differences is Pareto optimal. Interestingly, risk selec-
tion activities by insurers now appear in a favourable light, because they reduce
the information asymmetry that is the ultimate reason for these optima alleg-
edly not being attainable.
Indeed, the difficulties encountered with imposing uniform or at least
community-rated premiums and fully neutralizing risk selection incentives
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through risk adjustment provide testimony to the effect that health insurers are
to a considerable degree capable of gathering information about risk. In future,
genetic information (if not prohibited) will go a long way towards the first-best
equilibrium in health insurance markets. Letting insurers set premiums accord-
ing to risk has the two following benefits.
* Static efficiency: Insurers can weigh the cost and expected benefits of informa-
tion gathering about risk so as to arrive at an optimal degree of premium
differentiation according to risk. To the extent that they indeed equalize the
margin of premium over expected cost, the incentive to exclude risks of any
type should be zero and the first-best Pareto optimum reached. However,
recent evidence (Herring and Pauly, 2001) suggests that, even in the unregu-
lated market for individual risks, US health insurers do not fully differentiate
premiums according to risk. This points to the possibility of exclusion of
some very high risks. A pool for these risks (assigned risk pool) may still be
necessary.
* Dynamic efficiency: With risk-based premiums, consumers obtain the appro-
priate signals indicating to them that, by opting for contracts that induce more
preventive effort or a commitment to limit ex post moral hazard, they can
reap the benefit of future lower premiums. In turn, health insurers who
develop new plans that attract individuals with high future HCE can
count on receiving a higher premium. More generally, developing contracts
that appeal to particular segments of the population does not meet with the
regulator’s suspicion that they are motivated by an interest in risk selection,
but disguised as innovation. In addition, innovations entailing higher admin-
istrative expense but lowered HCE are not discriminated against by a risk
adjustment scheme that pays for high HCE only.
The main concern with risk-based premiums is of course equity. Particularly in
the context of health insurance, there are two conceptions of equity. One,
adopted e.g. by Van de Ven and Ellis (2000), considers the fact that a high
risk has to pay a high competitive premium as a violation of fairness, the
argument being that individuals should not be punished for their unfavourable
endowments. However, this implies that a rich person may be cross-subsidized
simply because he or she is a high-risk type. The other conception, espoused by
most economists, is that the health insurance premium to be paid may pose an
excessive burden on the individual. According to this conception of equity, citi-
zens characterized by the combination of high risk and low income and wealth
must be enabled to buy (expensive) health insurance coverage.
A tax-financed, earmarked transfer achieves this objective. The proposed
solution is to subsidize health insurance premiums to the extent that they exceed
a certain percentage of household income (with the subsidy less than complete
in order to safeguard incentives for search). Since competitive premiums reflect
risk factors, this comes close to the risk-adjusted subsidies proposed by Pauly
et al. (1992) and Van de Ven et al. (2000). In sum, health insurance is
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relieved from the task of systematic redistribution. Competitive insurance is
designed for redistribution governed by chance. Redistribution involving sys-
tematic differences between incomes or between health risks is the task of gov-
ernment, who has power to tax and to pay subsidies to achieve the equity goal.
Although of minor relevance for citizens, a major obstacle to such reform
comes from the fact that the budgets of public health insurance and the govern-
ment are not (fully) integrated. Politicians in government may resent having
their budgets charged with subsidies that clearly go to the ‘sick and poor’.
In order to assess the magnitude of budgetary restructuring, Zweifel
and Breuer (2002) calibrated a loss density function with a mean that
coincides with the average HCE of German statutory health insurers. Three
draws from this distribution were averaged and assigned as the fair premium
to the individuals of the official household survey. For simplicity no loading
for administrative expense was added. The maximum share of total
household income taken by health insurance is set at 15%, with the gap
between this threshold and the calculated fair premium making up the subsidy.
In this way, the total amount of subsidies can be calculated based on the joint
income and HCE distribution. The estimated transfer volume (for 2000, at
2004 exchange rates) amounts to roughly $510 per capita or US$42bn in the
aggregate.
However, in Germany employers pay part of the contributions to health
insurance. If these are paid out to workers, becoming part of taxable labour
income, tax revenue is estimated to increase by US$17bn. In this way, the net
transfer to be financed out of the public budget is some US$18bn. In addition,
unemployment insurance pays the health insurance premiums for the unem-
ployed, and the public pension scheme, part of the premiums of retired persons.
These payments amount to about US$20bn. They need not be made anymore
once the proposed premium subsidies come directly from the public purse.
Therefore, the net charge to the public purse due to the reform approaches
zero. At the same time, the volume of transfers is reduced from its current value,
occurring within German statutory health insurance, since transfers are more
targeted.
Since mixed financial arrangements of this type (or tax reductions
for health insurance payments made by employers) are widespread, one may
state
Conclusion 9: A rough estimate of the transfer volume needed to complement
risk-based health insurance premiums reveals that in the case
of Germany, offsetting flows may be sizable enough as to
result in a minimal net charge to the public purse. This result
is expected to be typical for other industrial countries relying
on tax-shielded employer’s contributions to health insurance
premiums.
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6. Summary and conclusions
This contribution argues for risk-based premiums also in public health insur-
ance. It reviews the properties of optimal insurance contracts in the presence
of both ex ante and ex post moral hazard to conclude that uniformity of pre-
miums is not compatible with optimality. On the part of insurers, the imposed
uniformity of premiums creates an incentive for risk selection. Risk adjustment
is designed to neutralize this incentive and redirect insurers’ efforts towards
innovation. It thus constitutes a secondary regulation induced by premium reg-
ulation and may be considered as part of a regulatory spiral that will result in a
more and more refined (and costly) scheme. However, even such refinements
(like diagnostic cost groups and pharmaceutical cost groups) are unlikely to
neutralize fully the risk selection incentive; in addition, they punish innovative
effort on the part of insurers. These efficiency losses can be avoided by letting
insurers charge risk-based premiums, complemented by a tax-financed transfer
mechanism. An earmarked subsidy that limits payments for health insurance
to 15% of labour income before deductions was shown to affect the public
budget only minimally, at least in the case of Germany. Therefore, a transition
towards a more efficient but also equitable way of financing health insurance
does not necessarily require a sizable restructuring of financial flows between
social security and the government.
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